Central Park: A Collaborative Renewal

Situation

New York City’s Central Park was conceived in the mid 1800s as an urban oasis, a refuge from the hustle-and-bustle of city life. Frederick Law Olmstead, Central Park’s designer, said the raison d’être for parks was, “…a ground to which people may easily go after their days work is done, and where they may stroll for an hour, seeing, hearing, and feeling nothing of the bustle and jar of the streets, where they shall, in effect, find the city put far away from them...” And for many years, Central Park was just that for city residents.

By the late 1970s, however, Central Park was little more than a dangerous, litter-strewn wasteland. Fixtures of the park, such as Belvedere Castle and Bethesda Terrace, were vandalized and damaged. An average of 900 felonies occurred in the park annually between 1979 and 1986; media attention to crime in Central Park, always high, underscored New Yorkers’ perception that the park was a dangerous place to be.

How had Central Park deteriorated so? Quite simply, the resources for park maintenance, both human and financial, had decreased sharply. During the 1960s and 1970s, City Hall cut the parks department’s budget repeatedly in response to the growing fiscal crisis; in turn, the department was forced to lay off more than half the workforce between 1974 and 1979. The lack of upkeep invited further abuse that the department was unable to reverse. By 1982, the entire New York City park system had accumulated an estimated $3 billion worth of overdue maintenance. The city was simply unable to take care of its parks by itself.

In 1978, Mayor Ed Koch appointed Gordon J. Davis as Parks Commissioner to take charge of this situation. While the parks department’s budget had increased slightly, it was not enough to turn New York parks around. Davis instead began to transfer the ownership of park functions such as golf courses and refreshment stands to private firms and corporations to run as concessions, effectively reducing the parks’ costs for such functions. Thanks to Davis, this policy, often referred to as “load shedding”, evolved into a full-blown strategy that focused on partnerships with private entities to run park operations. His successor, Henry Stern, continued this approach.

Still, load shedding only reduced the amount of funds flowing out of the parks; to truly rehabilitate the parks system, funds would need to flow in as well, and in abundance. The stage was set for the public sector to engage the private for more resources.

Private Groups

Private interest in giving volunteer support to Central Park has existed since the late 1920s, when organizations began to form specifically for that purpose. In 1974, in response to the growing mismanagement of Central Park, two citizens’ groups arose to harness volunteer efforts and funds to clean up the park. The Central Park Community Fund raised funds for maintenance equipment, and the Central Park Task Force sponsored youth employment and school volunteer programs for park cleanup and beautification. The groups often worked together to achieve their shared goals.

The first step the City took towards working formally with these groups was the recruitment of Elizabeth “Betsy” Barlow Rogers, executive director of the Central Park Task Force, as Central Park Administrator. In 1979, Davis appointed Rogers to this newly-created role, making a single person responsible for the Park’s restoration and operations. Rogers had impressive credentials. Prior to her appointment, Rogers had served as the executive director of the Central Park Task Force; she had both the experience and clout necessary to effectively oversee the park in an official capacity. That she was a Wellesley art history graduate with a Yale master’s degree in city planning who had authored three books on parks and Frederick Law Olmsted only added to her qualifications.

As Central Park Administrator, Rogers was a city employee, but it is worth noting that Davis had asked her to raise her own salary from private funds. From the very beginning, her role straddled both sectors to begin to bring them together. She and Davis both recognized that it would be necessary to organize a group of people to administer to the park, and thus, the idea for the Conservancy was born.

The Conservancy

Davis and Rogers enlisted William S. Beinecke, a distinguished philanthropist, to serve as founding chairman of the Conservancy, to populate the board with influential members, and to raise seed money. The composition of the board was critical. It had six “public” trustees: three mayoral appointees, of which Beinecke was one, as well as the Manhattan Borough President, the Parks Commissioner, and the Central Park Administrator. The remaining trustees were private.

Beinecke wisely selected from the leadership of the Central Park Task Force and the Central Park Community Fund for his private trustees, three from each organization. In turn, the groups dissolved their boards. Corporate executives and community leaders were also sought as trustees. The Conservancy was soon incorporated as a private non-profit organization, with Rogers serving as both Central Park Administrator and President of the Conservancy, linking the two sectors together.

The Conservancy undertook two projects: an extensive survey and assessment of the Park to create a comprehensive plan for restoration, and fundraising in order to complete the restoration. Rogers hired a team of landscape architects to complete the survey, which took three years. In the meantime, urgent restoration work (such as the restoration of the dilapidated Sheep Meadow) began, using a mix of city and state funding as well as volunteer labor.

The result of the survey, a master plan that called for $150 million worth of renovations to the park over a 10-15 year period, gave the Conservancy a great amount of fundraising to do. Rogers knew that to raise this kind of money, she would need to cultivate wealthy, well-connected donors. Her approach to doing so was to position Central Park as a prestigious cultural institution, attracting prominent citizens eager to donate their money and time to a cause that would allow them to display and elevate their status. For his part, Beinecke secured in writing the mayor’s assurance that the City would not reduce its financial commitment to the park as a result of Conservancy funds, which proved useful in convincing prospective donors to make a pledge.

The Conservancy was overwhelmingly successful at both fundraising and restoration work. In its first ten years of existence, it raised more than $65 million for the park. It also staffed a visitor’s center with volunteers who were happy to give their time to answering questions and later, provide greater services, such as staging art exhibits, musical performances, and educational programs for children. As the Conservancy implemented the restoration plan it had conceived, graffiti was removed, park fixtures were refurbished, and grounds were landscaped; this work was completed both by volunteers and staff paid both by the city and the Conservancy.

The surest sign of success of this partnership? People began to use the park again.

Collaborative Governance

For the first eighteen years of the Conservancy’s existence, the Parks department and the Conservancy worked together towards the shared goal of rehabilitating Central Park. The arrangement, however, lacked the hallmark of collaborative governance: shared discretion over how that goal was achieved. For the most part, it was up to the Parks Commissioner to determine how Conservancy funds were used.

This imbalance changed in 1998, when New York City’s government signed a legal agreement transferring the stewardship of Central Park to the Conservancy. While the agreement specified that the Conservancy would maintain and repair Central Park “to the reasonable satisfaction of the Commissioner,” it also outlined which facilities, prerogatives, and functions remained with the City. What was unusual about the document was that it gave the Conservancy the ability to decide how it would achieve its objectives. For example, litter was to be removed and grass was to be moved “as needed”; plants were to be fertilized “as appropriate.” This was a radical departure from typical contracting language, which usually tightly specifies how tasks are carried out. Instead, it was up to the Conservancy to determine how it managed the park.

Also unusual was the financial part of the agreement, which focused more on the money the Conservancy would acquire for the park than what money the City would give. The Conservancy was required “to raise and expend annually a minimum of $5 million” for “maintenance, repairs, programming, landscaping, and the renovation and rehabilitation of existing facilities.” The Parks department was required to give the Conservancy an annual stipend of $1 million, plus an incentive payment of $.50 for every dollar raised beyond that $5 million. The Conservancy was also required to submit a detailed operating budget to the Commissioner for approval, and to allow the Parks Department access to all documents.

In the years that followed the signing of the agreement, Central Park became again New York City’s singular treasure. With at least one multi-million dollar restoration project occurring every year, and park cleanup happening daily, the park has continued to bloom, and the people have turned out in droves. In 2002, approximately 25 million people visited the park, and nearly 40 major movies have scenes that were filmed in Central Park during the Conservancy’s stewardship. The Conservancy employs approximately 150 staff, the Parks department supplies 23, and the New York City Police Department handles the park security.